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ASSESSING THE GIG ECONOMY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: HOW PLATFORM WORK CHALLENGES
THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN LEGAL ORDERS
Jeremy Pilaar*
Both the gig economy 's critics and supporters tend to assume
that it represents an assault on current employment structures.
Comparative theory, however, emphasizes that legal regimes are
durable in the face of new challenges. Fortunately, the gig
economy 's prevalence throughout the world gives scholars the
chance to evaluate this tension. This paper analyzes whether
platform work undermines existing legal systems by testing two
comparative theories in the United States and France. The first
predicts that French law should mobilize against platform firms to
protect producers' livelihoods and that American law should
embrace these services for lowering consumer prices. The second
forecasts that French welfare institutions should more aggressively
safeguard gig workers' wellbeing than their American
counterparts. Surprisingly, the results show that neither hypothesis
holds. Though France initially fought companies like Uber to
preserve taxi drivers' advantages, it began adopting a more
consumer-friendly stance toward the sector after its 2017
elections. The United States, meanwhile, has become a site of
mounting resistance to the way platform firms treat their workers.
Furthermore, while U.S. social programs have done little to shield
platform workers from market forces, those in France have evinced
similar features; both countries have denied these laborers basic
assurances such as a minimum wage, unemployment insurance,
and workers' compensation. These findings suggest that the gig
economy embodies a significant challenge to long-standing legal
regimes-one that could even cause dissimilar nations to converge
in the coming years. Lawmakers will need to devote more attention
to the plight of workers caught in what appears to be a
fundamental legal reordering.
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of work has transformed over the past thirty years.
While full-time jobs were the norm in industrialized countries for
much of the twentieth century, they have gradually been replaced
by non-standard employment relationships that offer lower pay,
less predictable hours, fewer benefits, and uncertain career
prospects.1 No aspect of this change has generated a more heated
debate than the rise of the so-called "gig" or "platform" economy,
2
symbolized by ridesharing companies like Uber and its
competitors. 3 To some, these companies embody a "wave of small-
scale entrepreneurship and business growth with powerful new
opportunities."4 To others, they threaten to turn labor markets into
"a dystopia where regular careers are vanishing, every worker is a
freelancer, every labor transaction is a one-night stand, and we
collude with one another to cut our wages."
5
These diverging predictions share two important assumptions:
first, that the gig economy represents a fundamental assault on
existing employment structures; and second, that it will drive
* SFALP Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. I thank James
Whitman for encouraging me to pursue this project. I am also grateful to the
editors of the Journal of Law and Policy for their thoughtful comments and
tireless efforts to prepare this piece for publication. The views expressed in this
article are mine alone; they do not represent or reflect the views of any other
person, entity, or organization.
' "Non-standard" is a term of art long used in sociology and labor law to
distinguish new forms of work from the "standard," 9-5 employment
relationships that prevailed in the mid-20th century. See Non-standard Forms of
Employment, INT'L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/non-
standard-employment/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2019); see also
infra Section I.A.
2 See generally Will Kenton, Gig Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (May 24,
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gig-economy.asp (defining "gig
economy" and noting the possibility that America is on its way to becoming a
"gig" economy).
' See infra Section I.B.
4 Dan Blacharski, Gig Economy Platforms Are Creating a New Class of
Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/288178.
' Robert Kuttner, The Task Rabbit Economy, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 10,
2013), http://prospect.org/article/task-rabbit-economy.
ASSESSING THE GIG ECONOMY
convergence between countries in which platform firms do
business. From a legal perspective, however, neither outcome is
obvious. Comparative theory has long emphasized that legal
regimes are durable in the face of new challenges, absorbing rather
than bending to them; their historical trajectory firmly tends
toward continuity.6 Fortunately, the gig economy's prevalence
throughout the developed world gives scholars the chance to
rigorously evaluate this tension.
This Article analyzes whether the gig economy undermines
existing legal regimes by testing two leading comparative theories
in France and the United States. The first predicts that French law
should mobilize against platform firms to protect workers'
livelihoods, and that American law should embrace these services
for lowering consumer prices. The second forecasts that French
welfare institutions should more aggressively safeguard gig
workers' wellbeing than their American counterparts.
As the results show, neither hypothesis holds. Although France
initially fought companies like Uber to preserve taxi drivers'
advantages, the country began adopting a more consumer-friendly
stance toward the sector soon after its 2017 elections.7 The United
States, meanwhile, has become a site of mounting resistance to the
way platform firms treat their workers.8 Furthermore, while social
programs in the U.S. have done little to shield platform workers
from market forces, those in France have evinced similar features. 9
Both countries have denied these laborets vital legal assurances
such as a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and workers'
compensation, condemning them to the ranks of an increasingly
precarious underclass.1" Together, these findings suggest that the
gig economy represents a major challenge to long-standing legal
orders-one that could even spur convergence between dissimilar
nations' legal regimes in the coming years.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the growth
of non-standard work and situates the gig economy's rise within it.
6 See infra Part II.
I See infra Section III.A.
8 See infra Section II1.B.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part IV.
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Part II outlines each of the foregoing theories and their
expectations about platform work's evolution in the United States
and France. Part III demonstrates that the gig economy challenges
prevailing approaches to the consumer-producer relationship in
each nation. Finally, Part IV shows how gig work similarly
undermines each country's traditional welfare orientation.
I. CHANGING LABOR MARKETS IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD
Advanced economies' labor markets have noticeably shifted in
the past thirty years. While developed countries were once
characterized by full-time employment relationships that conferred
good pay and benefits, they have experienced a persistent rise in
non-standard work.1' These non-standard working arrangements-
which echo configurations prevalent in the nineteenth century-
tend to feature less predictable hours, lower pay, and fewer
protections against the risks of ill health, old age, and
unemployment. 12 Many scholars fear that the proliferation of non-
standard work will deepen already record levels of wealth
inequality. 13 Perhaps no manifestation of this phenomenon has
garnered more attention than the emergence of the so-called "gig
economy."' 4 From a legal standpoint, however, it remains unclear
just how much of a challenge platform companies pose to existing
employment and welfare structures.
A. The Rise of Non-Standard Work
In the decades following World War II, most advanced
capitalist economies organized their labor markets around what
scholars call the "standard employment relationship" (SER).' 5 This
'1 See infra Section I.A.
12 See infra Section I.A.
13 See infra Section I.A.
'4 See infra Section II.B.
15 Katherine V.W. Stone, The Decline of the Standard Contract of
Employment in the United States: A Socio-Regulatory Perspective, in
RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT 63 (Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013);
Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs, The Transformation of Employment
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arrangement, which mainly applied to male breadwinners in
manufacturing or a unionized trade, was defined by the exchange
of labor for money, tasks performed at the employer's worksite
according to pre-set schedules, and the expectation of long-term,
full-time employment. 16 The "standard contract.., promised job
security, predictable promotions, and wage growth opportunities.
In addition, it often included health insurance, pensions, vacation
entitlements, and other employer-based benefits.' 7 As labor law
expert Katherine Stone has observed, "the standard employment
contract became one of the pillars of the postwar economic system.
Decent wages gave workers the opportunity to consume, to acquire
the accoutrements of middle-class life, and to better the prospects
of their families."' 18
In the 1980s, however, the SER began eroding across the
developed world. 19 Globalization, technological change, and public
policies favoring more intense competition pushed firms to seek
the "flexibility to hire and fire on short notice; to increase or shrink
the overall size of their workforce; to adjust pay to short-term
performance results; to redeploy workers within the firm and to
outside production partners; and to retain workers with particular
skills on an as-needed basis."2  As a result, companies
progressively turned to non-standard forms of employment,2'
Regimes: A Worldwide Challenge, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION:
BEYOND THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 2 (Katherine V.W. Stone
& Harry Arthurs eds., 2013).
16 Ame L. Kalleberg & Peter V. Marsden, Transformation of the
Employment Relationship, in EMERGING TRENDs IN THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 3 (2015).
17 Stone, supra note 15.
18 Stone & Arthurs, supra note 15, at 2.
19 See id. at 7-10; Katherine V.W. Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization:
Changing Firm-Level Employment Practices and Shifting Employment Risks in
the United States, REs. PAPER 07-13 UCLA SCH. OF L., LAW & ECON. REs.
PAPER SERIES 12 (2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1023696 [hereinafter In the
Shadow of Globalization].
20 In the Shadow of Globalization, supra note 19, at 2-3.
21 Id. at 10.
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primarily part-time, temporary, contract, on-call, and independent
work.22
These arrangements have multiplied rapidly across
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) nations. In the United States, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has estimated that "contingent"
work, which it defines to include all of the above categories, rose
from 35.3 percent of employed workers in 2006 to 40.4 percent in
2010.23 Economists Laurence Katz and Alan Krueger have
similarly found that "alternative" workers-defined to include all
of the foregoing groups other than part-timers-grew from 10.1
percent of the American labor force in 2005 to 15.8 percent in
2015.24 Remarkably, as the authors emphasized in their study, "all
net employment growth in the U.S. economy from 2005 to 2015
appears to have occurred in alternative work arrangements.'" 25
This trend also looks likely to endure: a 2014 SAP/Oxford
Economics survey revealed that "83 percent of [corporate]
22 Arne L. Kalleberg, Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-Time,
Temporary & Contract Work, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 341 (2000). Part-time workers
are generally defined as those working less than 35 hours a week. Id. at 343.
Contract employees work for firms that provide services to other employees
under contract; they are generally assigned to a single client and perform their
duties at its place of business. Id. at 350-51. Temporary workers perform
services for clients over a narrow period; they are usually leased to other
companies on an hourly basis rather than staffed to one project. Id. at 346-47.
Independent contractors are self-employed workers who market and provide
services to clients on their own. Id. at 355. Finally, on-call workers are
individuals called into work on an as-needed basis. Id. at 353; see also PETER S.
FISHER, ELAINE DITSLER, COLIN GORDON, & DAVID WEST, NONSTANDARD
JOBS, SUBSTANDARD BENEFITS 5 (Iowa Pol'y Proj. 2005),
http://www.cfcw.org/nonstandard.pdf.
23 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT
WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, & BENEFITS 4 (2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf.
24 Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015 2 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22667, 2016), http://www.sole-
jole.org/16KK.pdf.
25 Id. at 7.
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executives sa[id] they w[ould] be increasing the use of contingent,
intermittent or consultant employees." 2
6
European labor markets have mirrored these changes. Between
1987 and 2007, temporary work increased from 8.3 percent to 14.7
percent of overall EU employment.27 Part-time work rose from 16
percent to 19 percent.28 Conversely, between 2006 and 2016, the
proportion of standard jobs in the EU labor market fell from 62
percent to 59 percent "in favour of more flexible types of work.,
29
On average across 29 OECD countries, non-standard work made
up 33 percent of total employment in 2013. 30 As the European
Parliament's Directorate-General for Internal Policies has
remarked, "[i]f this trend continues, it may well become the case
that standard contracts will only apply to a minority of workers
within the next decade." 31
These changes have proven especially prominent in France.
Between the mid-1980s and late 1990s, the percentage of workers
with non-permanent contracts more than doubled, from 5 percent
to 12 percent.32 Though that growth has since slowed, nonstandard
job creation has continued to outpace that of standard employment,
26 The Looming Talent Crisis: Research Shows Companies Unprepared
for Future of Work, SAP NEWS (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://news.sap.com/workforce-2020-looming-talent-crisis-research-shows-
companies-unprepared-future-work/.
27 Zoe Adams & Simon Deakin, Institutional Solutions to Precariousness
andInequality in Labour Markets, 52 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 779, 790 (2014).
28 Id. at 789.
29 Precarious Employment in Europe Part I. Patterns, Trends, and Policy




30 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV'T, NEW FORMS OF WORK IN




31 Precarious Employment in Europe Part I.- Patterns, Trends, and Policy
Strategy, supra note 29, at 32.
32 Id. at 47.
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with the former rising twice as fast between 2007 and 2013.13 This
progress has largely been fueled by an increase in the number of
"fixed-term contracts (FTCs) of very short duration." 34 In France,
"between 2000 and 2012, [fixed-term contracts] of less than one
week increased by 120 percent while [those] of less than one
month but more than one week increased by 38.6 percent.- 35 The
result has been that, "of the 20 [million] or so job contracts signed
[in France] each year, two-thirds are now for less than a month.,
36
In 2014, a total of "3.2 million people, or 14 percent of all
employees," held a non-standard contract.37
Though often cast as a new phenomenon, non-standard
employment was the norm in Western countries for much of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 38 Economist Jim Stanford
has underlined that many features of independent work, such as its
proclivity toward "on-call labour, piece-based compensation, and
the requirement that workers provide their own capital
equipment.. . are as old as capitalism." 39 Furthermore, "[c]asual,
seasonal and contract labour were the predominant forms of paid
work as capitalism first emerged and consolidated."4 Some
33 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV'T, supra note 30, at 23-25.
31 Precarious Employment in Europe Part I: Patterns, Trends, and Policy
Strategy, supra note 29, at 47.
35 Id.
36 Anne-Sylvanie Chassany, New World of Work: Outsiders Battle in
France's Dual Jobs Market, FIN. TIMEs (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/a42b533e- 1 fc0-11 e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.
37 Precarious Employment in Europe Part 11: Country Case Studies, at 11,




38 Michael Quinlan, The 'Pre-Invention' of Precarious Employment: The
Changing World of Work in Context, 23 ECON. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 6 (2012);
Jim Stanford, The Resurgence of Gig Work. Historical and Theoretical
Perspectives, 28 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 382 (2017).
39 Stanford, supra note 38, at 383.
40 Id. at 385.
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scholars have therefore labeled the rise of non-standard work as a
form of labor "recommodification. 4
1
This "recommodification" has sparked fears of the low wages
and sparse protections characteristic of earlier periods. 42 Evidence
suggests there is reason to worry that non-standard employment
may increase income precarity and inequality. In a 2015 survey of
American workers, the GAO found that those in non-standard
positions earned about 10.6 percent less per hour, and 47.9 percent
less per year, than those in SERs.43 The study further discovered
that non-standard workers experienced more job instability and
were less likely to have employer-provided benefits. 44 Confirming
these results, Katz and Krueger have concluded that people "in
alternative work arrangements earn considerably less per week
than do regular employees with similar characteristics and in
similar occupations. 45
The story looks the same in Europe. One 2016 OECD analysis
"found that non-regular employees are likely to earn less than full-
time permanent employees... [and that existing] pay gaps are
likely to increase over time.",46 The report also showed that "[n]on-
regular workers.., have a significantly higher probability of being
in unemployment one year after their current.., arrangement as
compared to full-time regular workers., 47 In France, the data
highlight that temporary employees face a poverty risk three times
higher than that of permanent workers.48 Fixed-term contracts, in
particular, are associated with low wages.49
Finally, because most welfare states were built around the
SER, non-standard workers on both continents risk receiving fewer
41 See generally Carlos Frade & Isabelle Darmon, New Modes of Business
Organization and Precarious Employment: Towards the Recommodification of
Labour?, 15 J. EUR. SOC. POL'Y 107 (2005).
42 Id.
43 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 23, at 5-6.
44 Id.
41 Katz & Krueger, supra note 24, at 26.
46 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV'T, supra note 30, at 26.
47 Id. at 28.
48 Precarious Employment in Europe Part L Patterns, Trends, and Policy
Strategy, supra note 29, at 66 (Figure 10).
49 Id. at 13.
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and less extensive job protections. In the United States, robust
private health and pension packages have long been one of the key
features of the SER.5 0 To this day, public entitlements such as
social security, unemployment insurance, and worker's
compensation remain a function of an individual's earning
power.51 In France, social insurance against the vagaries of old
age, sickness, and work accidents similarly varies in generosity
according to a person's contributions.52 Non-standard workers' low
wages and fractured job histories jeopardize these safeguards.
B. The Gig Economy: The Labor Market Transition 's
Latest Phase
Perhaps no development better captures the anxieties
associated with non-standard work than the emergence of the "gig
economy," and in particular the rise of ridesharing services like
Uber.5 3 Many are familiar with Uber's business model, which uses
an online platform to quickly connect customers with drivers.54
These drivers are generally classified as independent contractors
rather than employees in an SER.55 This means that they do not
have a wage contract and are responsible for their own tax
50 Stone, supra note 15, at 63.
51 Robert A. Moffitt, The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S.
Welfare System, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 729, 731-34 (2015).
52 See Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Adam Saunders, & Marek Naczyk, The Age
of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies,
in THE AGE OF DUALIZATION: THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY IN
DEINDUSTRIALIZING SOCIETIES 155-56 (Patrick Emmenegger, Silja
Hausermann, Bruno Palier, & Martin Seeleib-Kaiser eds., 2012).
" See generally Geoffrey Dudley, David Banister, & Tim Schwanen, The
Rise of Uber and Regulating the Disruptive Innovator, 88 POL. Q. 492 (2017).
51 See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 85, 86-87 (2016).
15 See Rebecca Smith & Sarah Leberstein, Rights on Demand: Ensuring
Workplace Standards and Worker Security in the On-Demand Economy, 4
NAT'L EMP. L. PROJ. 3 (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-
Demand-Report.pdf; see generally NICOLAS AMAR & LouIs-CHARLES VIOSSAT,
LES PLATEFORMES COLLABORAT1VES, L'EMPLOI ET LA PROTECTION SOCIALE
(Inspection Gdndrale des Affaires Sociales ed. 2016),
http://www.igas.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2015-121R.pdf.
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arrangements.56 In both popular and policy debates, "[u]berisation
has come to mean the turning of traditional service industries on
their head."-57 For the gig economy's opponents, the term has
become synonymous with the destruction of traditional jobs in the
sectors new companies enter, such as the taxi industry in the case
of Uber.58
Reliable data on the gig economy is hard to come by.5 9 Still,
evidence suggests that, like other non-standard work, it is growing
rapidly in both the United States and France. Katz and Krueger
have estimated that independent contractors grew from 6.9 percent
to 8.4 percent of the American labor force between 2005 and
2015-and that gig economy workers accounted for one-third of
that rise. 60 In France, there are more than one million "auto-
entrepreneurs ' '61 just eight years after the government created that
legal status to make it easier for independent workers, such as Uber
drivers and Deliveroo meal cyclers, to enter the service arena.
62
Researchers for the European Parliament recently declared that
"France is one of the leading sites in the development of the
56 See KATHERINE LUCAS MCKAY, REFORMING UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE TO SUPPORT INCOME STABILITY AND FINANCIAL SECURITY 5 (ASPEN
EPIC ed. 2017), http://www.aspenepic.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/ASPENEPIC_UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCE_0
2.pdf.
17 Simon Jack, Now What Next for Uberisation?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-41359327.
58 Guillaume Errard, "L'ubrisation De L'iconomie Va Ditruire Des




59 JANE DOKKO, MEGAN MUMFORD, & DIANE WHITMORE
SCHANZENBACH, WORKERS AND THE ONLINE GIG ECONOMY 2 (Hamilton Proj.,
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/workers and the online gigeconomy.pdf
60 Katz & Krueger, supra note 24, at 9, 16.
61 Michael Rose, France's Gig Economy Creates Hope and Tension as
Election Looms, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017, 4:55 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-gigeconomy-analysis-
idUSKBN 17DOITU.
62 See Precarious Employment in Europe Part I.- Patterns, Trends, and
Policy Strategy, supra note 29, at 178.
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platform economy in Europe, with the sector being much more
developed than in neighbouring countries such as Germany or
Spain."'63 Furthermore, whether in the United States, 64 France,65 or
the European Union,66 experts agree that the gig economy is set to
expand exponentially in the coming years.
Uber's rise has been particularly meteoric. While the company
was founded in 2009 and counted only a few thousand drivers in
its first year of operations, that number has since soared to 750,000
in the United States and 2 million around the world.6 7 In France,
Uber has formed a major part of the country's uptick in auto-
entrepreneurs. A Boston Consulting Group analysis found that
"one in four jobs created in the first half of 2016 in the Paris region
was due alone to cab services operated by Uber and its rivals."
68
These transport companies were also responsible for "15 percent of
new net jobs in the whole of France" during that period.69
This growth has raised many of the concerns associated with
other forms of non-standard employment. Gig workers must
contend with irregular schedules driven by demand fluctuations,
piecemeal compensation, and the high startup costs of providing
their own equipment. 7' According to a 2016 survey by the
European Parliament's Directorate-General for Internal Policies,
pay levels across a range of online platforms "were significantly
lower than national minimum wage rates across European
63 The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy, at 38,




I Katz & Krueger, supra note 24, at 3.
65 AMAR & VIOSSAT, supra note 55, at 74.
66 The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy, supra note
63, at 38.
67 Sara Ashley O'Brien, Uber Has More Work to Do Winning Over
Drivers, CNN (Dec. 18, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/uber-drivers- 180-days-of-
change/index.html.
68 Rose, supra note 61.
69 Id.
70 Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, Regulating Work in the Gig Economy:
What Are the Options?, 28 ECON. & LAB. REL. REv. 420,421 (2017).
ASSESSING THE GIG ECONOMY
countries and the U.S., ranging from a 54.1 percent gap in France
to [a] 3.4 percent [gap] in the United States., 71 Gig workers also
reported a "lack of task autonomy and dissatisfaction with career
prospects, pay levels, and job security... [that] was considerably
higher than the representative average figure across European labor
markets."72  Alarmingly, in France, nine out of ten auto-
entrepreneurs currently earn less than the country's minimum
wage.73
Gig workers also appear to have difficulty obtaining basic
benefits and social insurance. A 2016 GAO survey revealed that
independent contractors in the United States were "significantly
less satisfied [with their fringe benefits] than standard full-time
workers.,, 74 Likewise, the aforementioned European Parliament
survey found that "access to social protection schemes.. . was
very low for platform economy workers.7 5 Up to 70 percent of
[them]... reported that they could not access basic schemes like
pregnancy, childcare and housing benefits." 76 Only about a third of
platform workers were paying into a personal pension.77 In a 2017
Eurofound survey, 69 percent of self-employed French respondents
further indicated that they would not be financially secure in the
case of a long-term illness-a full 21 points above the EU
average.
78
71 The Social Protection of Workers in the Pla#'orm Economy, supra note
63, at 11.
72 Id.
71 Precarious Employment in Europe Part I. Country Case Studies, supra
note 37, at 16.
74 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 23, at 23.
75 The Social Protection of Workers in the Plaoform Economy, supra note
63, at 11.
76 Id. at 11-12.
77 Id. at 55.
78 EUROFOUND, EXPLORING SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
13 (2017),
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef publication/field ef doc
ument/efl 718en.pdf.
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C. Are These Trends Legally Significant?
Two points emerge from this portrait of the rise of non-
standard employment, and gig economy platforms in particular.
First, these forms of work appear to represent a significant
departure from the more stable and better remunerated labor
market relationships of the twentieth century-bringing with them
the specter of growing poverty and inequality on a wide scale.
Second, to the degree that non-standard arrangements have
flourished in both Europe and the United States, they raise the
possibility of convergence between employment and welfare
regimes that have heretofore been characterized by different levels
of generosity.
However, to say that these shifts appear significant and may
drive convergence is not enough. These observations represent
hypotheses at best. Scholars have the power to systematically
examine these changes to discern both their precise nature and the
extent to which they clash with existing legal structures. By
turning to theories that capture the internal workings of different
countries' legal systems, researchers may discover how radically,
if at all, non-standard work and its attendant challenges depart
from historical norms.
The remainder of this Article takes a first pass at this question
by focusing on the success of the gig economy, specifically
ridesharing services, in the United States and France. To cover all
types of non-standard work in a single essay would be impossible.
It is also, to some degree, unnecessary. In response to the surge of
non-standard employment over the past several decades, labor and
employment law scholars like Katherine Stone have already given
a fair amount of attention to relationships such as temporary and
contract work.7 9 The same cannot be said of the gig economy. As
Brishen Rogers has noted, debates surrounding platform
79 See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (providing
a framework for how norms of the workplace have changed from what they
were for most of the twentieth century); see also KATHERINE V.W. STONE &
HARRY ARTHURS EDS., RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE
STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (2013) (reviewing the erosion of
standard practices in employment contracts).
ASSESSING THE GIG ECONOMY
companies -like Uber have "so far generated more heat than
light., 80 Some analysts are prepared to conclude that their rise
"poses fundamental challenges to traditional models for regulating
work and setting minimum standards."8 Others, like Rogers,
maintain that their "longer-term impact on labor standards is quite
unclear.,
82
Here, comparativists have a special role to play. One of the
most remarkable features of the gig economy is its ascendance
across a range of countries.83 Uber's core business model remains
the same whether it tries to implement it in the United States or
France. 84 As the next section will show, however, the legal regimes
underlying each country's labor and welfare structures
substantially diverge. By examining them side-by-side, scholars
can determine just how much of a challenge platform companies
pose to existing institutions, and whether they are forcing states to
converge toward one variety of labor market. Given the affinities
between the gig economy and other non-standard arrangements,
this analysis also holds the potential to yield broader insights about
the future of work.
II. WHAT COMPARATIVE LEGAL THEORIES PREDICT ABOUT
CHANGING LABOR MARKETS
New labor market players like platform firms do not emerge in
a vacuum. Rather, they step into economies structured by laws that
govern everything from how workers and employers interact to the
social rights that people are due alongside employment. As legal
scholar and political economist David Grewal has observed,
"[c]apitalism is fundamentally a legal ordering: the bargains at the
heart of capitalism are the products of law... A detailed study of
these legal foundations is [therefore] essential to understanding the
80 Rogers, supra note 54, at 86.
81 Stewart & Stanford, supra note 70, at 2.
82 Rogers, supra note 54, at 86.
83 See supra Section I.B.
84 Dudley, Banister, and Schwanen, supra note 53, at 492.
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institutional structure of capitalism" and the ways new market
entrants build into it.
85
Comparativists have developed rich theories explaining
different countries' institutional underpinnings. Above all, their
research has stressed that there is not just one kind of capitalism,
but a variety.86 Platform companies like Uber should therefore be
expected to encounter unique legal responses in each market they
enter. Given this paper's focus on employment and social policy,
two theories stand out: 87 one juxtaposing "consumerist" and
"producerist" nations88 and another distinguishing various "worlds
of welfare."89 These frameworks differentiate France and the
United States along several dimensions. While each predicts that
85 David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626,
652, 656 (2014).
86 See infra Sections II.A and II.B.
87 One theory remains conspicuously absent from this list: Peter Hall and
David Soskice's "Varieties of Capitalism" (VOC). This framework focuses on
the ways in which private firms rely on a country's institutions to coordinate
with other market players. Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to
the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1-68 (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001). It distinguishes between two broad categories of states:
coordinated market economies, in which "firms pursue production strategies
that depend on workers with specific skills and high levels of corporate
commitment that are secured by offering them long employment tenures,
industry-based wages, and protective work councils," and liberal market
economies, in which "[1]abor market arrangements that allow companies to cut
costs in a downturn by shedding labor are complementary to financial markets
that render a firm's access to funds dependent on current profitability." Id. at 27,
32. Although the U.S. is a paradigmatic liberal market economy, this paper
leaves the VOC theory aside because France defies both its analytical
categories: France "appears... to be a political economy characterized
fundamentally by the uncertainty of expectations of economic actors. This is
because there is no organizing principle behind the French economy according
to which the principal actors orient their expectations." Pepper D. Culpepper,
Capitalism, Coordination, and Economic Change: the French Political
Economy Since 1985, in CHANGING FRANCE: THE POLITICS THAT MARKETS
MAKE 46 (Pepper D. Culpepper, Peter A. Hall, & Bruno Palier eds., 2008).
88 See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007).
89 See generally GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, THE THREE WORLDS OF
WELFARE CAPITALISM 5 (Polity Press, ed., 1990).
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platform firms like Uber should clash more vigorously with the
French legal regime, they undermine the notion that the gig
economy poses a fundamental challenge to existing legal orders.
A. Consumerism Versus Producerism
The first of these theories, elaborated by comparative law
scholar James Whitman, helps researchers make sense of labor
market dislocations by distinguishing between two legal
orientations: one that hews toward "consumerism" and one that
focuses more heavily on "producerism." 90 In a market economy,
most individuals are both consumers and producers. 91 The choice
of which interest to promote through law is therefore a cultural
one: it is "about which of these two possible economic identities
deserves priority in a modem market order."
92
A consumerist country features a body of laws which favor the
consumer's economic interests above other imperatives. 93 In
essence, this boils down to the "right of consumers to buy goods
and services at competitive prices, or the right of consumers to
warranties of quality and safety. 94 The consumer economic
interest should not be confused with the consumer protection
interest;
"[c]onsumer protection legislation.., tends to be
produced through paternalistic bureaucratic
regulations .... By contrast, the consumer
economic interest has an obvious affmity with
relatively free, unregulated markets .... [T]he core
value behind the protection of the consumer
economic interest is consumer sovereignty,
maximally immune from bureaucratic
interference." 95
90 Whitman, supra note 88, at 345.
91 Id. at 370.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 347.
94 Id. at 346.
95 Id. at 367.
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A producerist country, on the other hand, features a legal
system that "focuse[s] on the rights of actors on the supply side of
the market--on the rights of producers (as well as distributors). 96
From this perspective, "what matter[s], in both law and human life,
[is] the organization of production. To be fully human [is] to make
things, [such that] the primary problems of economic regulation
[are] problems in sorting out the conflicting rights of participants
in the processes of production and distribution. '" 97
Producerist systems stand in opposition to consumerist values:
"they reject law that aims to lower consumer prices no matter what
the cost to producers in distributors ... [For instance], they reject
law that allows enterprises like Wal-Mart to offer low prices at the
cost of protections for workers and small-square-footage stores."
98
It is important to note, however, that there is no single "producer"
interest; "[p]roducerist law does not favor 'the' producer interest,
but some producer interest. When [scholars] speak of producerism,
[they] are not speaking for any particular legal program, but of law
that tends to focus on rights, interests, and most especially conflicts
on the supply side." 99
Scholars have demonstrated that American law is more
consumerist and that French law is more producerist.' ° Across a
range of "sectors, American law has a consistently deeper affinity
with the ideal type of an order oriented toward the consumer
economic interest; while countries like France. . . , despite decades
of change, remain much more producerist in their basic
orientation.""1 1 This theory should therefore generate certain
expectations about the rise of the gig economy in each country.
In light of this theory, platform companies should conflict
forcefully with French work laws and fit comfortably in the
American legal landscape. These firms place large numbers of
low-paid independent workers in competition with one another to
deliver services to consumers as cheaply and as quickly as
96 Id. at 345.
97 Id. at 356 (emphasis in original).
98 Id. at 347.
99 Id. (emphasis in original).
100 Id. at 397-98.
101 Id.
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possible' 0 2 In doing so, they pull consumer demand away from
existing providers in the sector who have historically benefited
from greater pay and protections. This is precisely what has
happened to traditional taxi drivers as Uber has gained steam in
cities around the world. 103 French law should therefore be expected
to contest the rise of platform work in an effort to protect producer
interests. By contrast, American law should be expected to make
fast peace with companies that lower prices for consumers.
B. The Three Worlds of Welfare
As Part I of this essay explained, the gig economy does not
only threaten to upend workers' labor market status.10 4 Since this
status is intimately intertwined with an individual's access to job
benefits and social protections, changing modes of employment
risk affecting workers' income security along a broader
spectrum. 10 5 One comparative theory, Gosta Esping-Andersen's
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, focuses attention on this
question by exploring the process of "decommodification."1 °6 This
concept refers to "the degree to which individuals, or families, can
uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of
market participation."1 °7
By examining welfare laws along three dimensions-the
eligibility rules attached to social entitlements, the degree of
income replacement, and the range of cash benefits provided-
Esping-Andersen has shown that a country's level of
decommodification roughly corresponds to one of three ideal-
types: the social democratic welfare regime, the conservative
welfare regime, or the liberal welfare regime.10 8 Social democratic
countries, such as Norway and Sweden, provide universal access to
public welfare services on the basis of citizenship. 10 9 In doing so,
102 Smith & Leberstein, supra note 55, at 3-4.
103 See id. at 3-4.
104 See supra Section I.B.
105 See supra Section I.B.
106 ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 37.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 26-27, 47.
109 Id. at 27-28, 30.
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they maximize autonomy and reduce people's reliance on markets
or families for assistance.11 o They are the most decommodifying of
the three groupings."1
Conservative states, such as France and Germany, rely on
social insurance as their main welfare delivery mechanism." 2 This
means that they provide income replacement in the event of a
social risk-such as illness, old age, or unemployment-in
proportion to a worker's earnings and contributions into the
system." 3  As a result of this income-based stratification,
conservative states are on average less decommodifying than social
democratic nations.114 Nevertheless, they achieve a relatively high
level of decommodification thanks to generous baseline benefits
and efforts to extend social protections to vulnerable groups
outside the labor market.115
Liberal countries, such as the United States, feature the least
decommodification because they prioritize market dominance and
private benefit provision over public welfare." 6 In such countries,
the state only acts to reduce poverty and provide for basic needs,
largely through means-tested programs." 7 In the United States,
these programs include Medicaid, Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance (OASDI), Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP). 118 These benefits tend to be minimal, and
increase in value in tandem with earnings and work hours."
19
Similarly to the first theory, this framework suggests certain
hypotheses regarding the treatment of gig economy workers in the
United States and France. American platform workers should
110 Id. at 28.
1 Id.
112 Bruno Palier, Continental Western Europe, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE 606 (Francis G. Castles, Stephen Leibfried,
Jane Lewis, Herbert Orbinger, & Christopher Pierson eds., 2010).
113 Id.
114 ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 27.
115 See id.
116 See id at 26-27.
117 id.
118 Moffitt, supra note 51.
119 Id.
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expect to rely almost entirely on the market for retirement pay and
insurance against risks such as ill-health or injury. French platform
workers, by contrast, should expect a greater level of
decommodification courtesy of more robust public welfare
institutions. Exactly how much protection the latter should expect
given their low incomes and variable social insurance contributions
remains uncertain.
C. Testing the Theories
In short, theories of comparative law urge those making
alarmist claims about the gig economy to take pause. The
foregoing frameworks forecast neither that platform work will
upend international labor markets, nor that it will spur convergence
among legal systems that have long differed. Rather, they favor
predictions of regime continuity.
The first theory suggests that gig work should elicit a negative
response from French legal structures that place the interests of
producers above those of consumers.12 ° It further intimates that
platform work should fit neatly within a U.S. legal system which
promotes lower prices through competition. 121 The second theory
suggests that, much like prior labor market changes, the gig
economy should produce American workers who benefit from little
decommodification and French workers who enjoy a much higher
degree of social protection. 1
22
However, as the next two sections will show, empirical
evidence undermines both predictions.' 23 The gig economy may
therefore be as tumultuous a legal and economic development as it
first appears.
120 See supra Section H.A.
121 See supra Section II.A.
122 See supra Section H.B.
123 See infra Parts III and IV.
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Ill. How THE GIG ECONOMY CHALLENGES THE
CONSUMERIST/PRODUCERIST DICHOTOMY
Contrary to expectations, the rise of the gig economy does not
fit neatly into traditional consumerist or producerist molds. The
theory only partly holds with respect to France. 12 4 When Uber first
launched the full version of its platform in early 2014, the French
government intervened to prevent the company from diluting taxi
drivers' pay and protections, eventually shutting down many
features of the service. 125 However, there are signs that the country
has begun to move in a more consumerist direction under its
newly-elected president, Emmanuel Macron. 
126
The United States, meanwhile, has not proven to be a
consumerist paradise for ride-sharing applications.1 27 Through
state regulations, city ordinances, and private litigation, the
American legal system has mustered a strong producerist backlash
to platforms like Uber. 128 This reaction, which appears to be
growing in confidence, signals that the gig economy may present a
foundational challenge to existing legal orders.1 29 Relatedly, it
favors hypotheses that suggest a degree of convergence between
dissimilar nations.1 30
A. France: Still Producerist, But Moving Toward
Consumerism
i. The Producerist Impulse Strikes First
When it comes to ridesharing platforms, France at first largely
stayed true to its producerist reputation. These companies initially
encountered fierce government opposition upon introducing
services that threatened producers in the name of consumer
124 See infra Section III.A.
125 See infra Section III.A.i.
126 See infra Section HI.A.ii.
127 See infra Section III.B.
128 See infra Section III.B.
129 See infra Section III.C.
130 See infra Section III.C.
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welfare. The story of Uber's attempt to unveil a full-fledged
version of its application in Paris is instructive.
Although Uber first began operating in France in 2011, it did
not release a complete version of its platform-allowing anyone,
not just professionally-licensed black car drivers, to chauffeur
passengers-until it launched "UberPOP" in February 2014.131 The
French Parliament had hoped to get ahead of such services by
passing the so-called "15-minute law," which aimed to protect
taxis by requiring Uber drivers to wait a quarter-of-an-hour before
picking up a new customer. 132 However, just days before UberPOP
went live, the Conseil d'ittat, the country's supreme administrative
court, invalidated the law on the basis that it created a "competitive
imbalance."'1 33
This ruling did not deter the French government's desire to
preserve taxi drivers' labor and living standards. Just weeks after
UberPOP's launch, France's consumer protection agency began
lobbying to ban the platform on the grounds that it was a taxi
service "masquerading" as a ridesharing application. 134 Following
a wave of strikes by taxi drivers throughout the spring and summer
of 2014, the French Parliament passed a law in the early fall
requiring transport service providers other than taxis to return to a
garage in between fares.1 35 The legal system dealt Uber another
blow in October 2014, when a court ruled that the company was
violating precedent banning carpooling for profit, and ordered the
company to pay a E100,000 fine.136 Uber only won a small
131 Natasha Lomas, France Bans UberPop Starting January, TECH
CRUNCH (Dec. 15, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/15/uberpop-non/;
Mark Scott, French Law That Banned UberPop Service Survives Legal
Challenge, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/technology/french-law-that-banned-
uberpop-service-survives-legal-challenge.html.
132 Lomas, supra note 131.
133 Id.
134 Sam Schechner, Uber Technologies Fights French Court Ruling, WSJ
L. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/10/17/uber-
technologies-fights-french-court-ruling/.
135 Id.
136 Id.; Sam Schechner, Uber Launches Car Pooling Service in Paris,
WSJ (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-launches-carpooling-
service-in-paris- 1415896525.
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reprieve in December 2014, when a judge decided not to fully ban
UberPOP in a case brought by Parisian taxi associations, which
alleged that the company was engaging in unfair competition in a
market where the one-time fee for a taxi license cost up to
$300,000. 137
As in the face of prior rulings favoring the company,
lawmakers quickly responded to vindicate producer interests. Just
days after the judge handed down his decision, which sparked
strikes during which taxis halted traffic across Paris, the French
government announced that it would ban UberPOP through
legislation known as the "Th6venoud Law."'1 38 The law required all
drivers who chauffeured passengers to obtain a professional license
and adequate insurance beginning January 1, 2015.139 It also
prevented ridesharing platforms from using GPS software to show
the locations of potential customers. 140 The Interior Ministry
stressed that the law would help "better regulat[e] the profession to
avoid unfair competition" amongst providers. 
141
As soon as the new law went into effect, Paris police began
vigorously enforcing it. 142 Citing a provision allowing penalties of
up to $17,000 and one year in prison, they issued fines to over one
hundred drivers who continued to pick up fares through
UberPOP. 143 Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve warned that
vehicles caught using the application in the capital would "be
137 Laure Fourquet & Mark Scott, Uber Drivers Face Fines in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/uber-drivers-
face-fines-in-paris/.
138 David Jolly & Mark Scott, France Says It Will Ban Uber's Low-Cost




140 Julia Fioretti, EU Commission Asks France For More Information on
Taxi Law, REUTERS (May 28, 2015),
https ://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBNOOD2GX20150528.
141 Jolly & Scott, supra note 138.
142 Fourquet & Scott, supra note 137.
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systematically seized., 144 French President Frangois Hollande also
lent strong support to traditional taxi drivers, stating that UberPOP
"'doesn't respect any laws' and should be dissolved."' 45
Nonetheless, throughout 2015, Uber and many of its drivers
continued to flout the restrictions. 4 6 French taxi drivers escalated
the intensity of their strikes in protest.147 In June 2015, nearly
3,000 taxi drivers took to the streets to violently denounce
UberPOP, shutting down major thoroughfares, burning cars, and in
some cases attacking people thought to be using the platform. 148
To quell tensions, Interior Minister Cazeneuve asked the Paris
police chief to issue a decree making UperPOP illegal in the
city. 149 The French government also took the unusual step of
arresting both Uber's head of European operations and its French
CEO-charging them with running an illegal taxi operation,
deceiving consumers, and violating privacy laws. 5 ° Cazeneuve
admitted, however, that only a court could affirm the platform's
illegality throughout the nation.''
He did not have to wait long for the French justice system to
make a decision, once more in the producerist mold. On September
22, 2015, France's highest court ruled the Th6venoud Law
constitutional. 5 2 The court certified that only licensed taxi drivers
144 Laura Smith-Spark & Jethro Mullen, French Government Orders Paris
Police to Crack Down on Uber After Protests, CNN (June 26, 2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/26/europe/france-paris-uberpop-protests/.
145 Id.
146 Greg Sandoval, Uber Execs Dodge Bullet in France But Criminal Case
Reveals Flaws in Expansion Strategy, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://www.geekwire.com/2016/uber-execs-dodge-bullet-in-france-but-
criminal-case-reveals-flaws-in-expansion-strategy/.
"I Romain Dillet, French Anti-Uber Protest Turns to Guerrilla Warfare
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and chauffeurs could use technology putting them in touch with
riders, cementing the UberPOP ban into law. 153 in January 2016,
Uber suffered another setback when a Paris Grand Tribunal
ordered it to pay France's national taxi union E1.2 million in
damages for unlawfully telling drivers that they could stop on
public roadways or cruise the city while awaiting a fare-
privileges that legal precedent had limited to taxi services.154 In
June 2016, a French court again fined the company E800,000 "for
running an illegal taxi service with non-professional drivers"
during the period that it marketed UberPOP. 155 The platform failed
to find a more receptive audience at the EU level: in April 2018,
the Court of Justice of the European Union held that France had
the right to bring criminal charges against Uber's managers for
running an unlawful taxi service. 156
ii. Consumerist Principles Are Gaining Steam
Early on, France's reaction to the gig economy lived up to its
producerist image. The country's legislators and judges repeatedly
used the law to prevent Uber's price-cutting model from
encroaching on the livelihoods of transport service providers. 57
Nevertheless, in the wake of the 2017 presidential election, there
153 CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONEL [Constitutional Council], DcIISIoN NO




154 Le Monde Staff/Reuters, Uber France Condamn~e 6 Verser 1,2
Million D'euros 6 L 'Union Nationale des Taxis, LE MONDE (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/01/27/uber-france-condamne-a-
verser-1-2-million-d-euros-a-l-union-nationale-des-taxis48545683224.html.
155 Chine Labb6, French Court Fines Uber, Execs for Illegal Taxi Service,
REUTERS (June 9, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-ubertech-
court/french-court-fmes-uber-execs-for-illegal-taxi-service-idUSKCNOYV 1DQ.
156 Julia Fioretti, Uber Loses EU Court Case in Fight Against French
Criminal Charges, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-court-eu/uber-loses-eu-court-case-in-
fight-against-french-criminal-charges-idUSKBN 1HHOW4.
157 See supra Section IlI.A.i.
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have been signs that France may be shifting in a more consumerist
direction.
While France has aggressively defended incumbent producers'
labor market advantages, it has not been nearly as willing to trade
consumer welfare for enhanced independent worker protections.
Although UberPOP no longer exists, Uber continues to operate in
France as a platform which connects professionally licensed
chauffeurs with prospective riders.158 Most of these chauffeurs are
auto-entrepreneurs responsible for their own incomes and taxes.15 9
Though the government has acknowledged that their livelihoods
are more precarious than those of full-time workers,' 60 it has been
slow to improve their situation. There are currently only a handful
of cases before French courts alleging that auto-entrepreneurs are
misclassified employees who should benefit from higher salaries
and social guarantees.1 61 So far, none of these cases have led to a
reclassification decision.' 62
The French government has also been much quicker to
improve consumer utility in platform markets than to safeguard
producer interests. In 2016, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls
commissioned a first-of-its-kind report on the development of the
gig economy to sharpen the government's policy response to the
sector.163 The final product, prepared by lawmaker Pascale
Terrasse (and dubbed the "Terrasse Report" by the press), outlined
a range of legal proposals designed to both maximize platform
users' economic interests and increase gig workers' welfare. 164
158 Labb6, supra note 155.
159 AMAR & VIOSSAT, supra note 55, at 16; Edouard de Mareschal, VTC:
L 'usage du Statut D'auto-Entrepreneur Fait D~bat, LE FIGARO (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/2014/02/10/20005-2014021 OARTFIG0003 1 -vtc-
1-usage-du-statut-d-auto-entrepreneur-fait-debat.php.
160 AMAR & VIOSSAT, supra note 55, at 107-116.
161 Id. at 54.
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Thus far, however, only the first set of recommendations from
the Terrasse Report have been enacted. Less than a year after the
report went public, the French Parliament codified three of the four
reform proposals centered on consumer utility: (1) a law requiring
online platforms to more clearly list price information and the
factors that go into pricing so that consumers can make efficient
economic decisions;165 (2) a law requiring that gig economy
platforms transparently communicate the terms and conditions of
their relationship with each consumer, the regulations applicable to
their transactions, and the nature and extent of any quality
assurances they offer;' 66 and (3) a law bolstering platforms'
obligation to make customer feedback available and plainly visible
to consumers wishing to use their software.
167
While the report also included calls to clarify auto-
entrepreneurs' tax status, and alter social programs to reflect these
workers' low wages and lack of fringe benefits,' 68 the French
government has yet to heed them. The major labor law reform
165 Dcret n' 2017-1434 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations
d'information des oprateurs de plateformes numdriques, [Law 2017-1434 of
September 29, 2017 on the information obligations of digital platform operators]
Oct. 5, 2017,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035720
908&fastPos= 1 &fastReqld=1 151966919&categorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTe
xte.
166 Dcret n' 2017-1435 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif A la fixation d'un
seuil de connexions A partir duquel les op~rateurs de plateformes en ligne
6laborent et diffusent des bonnes pratiques pour renforcer la loyaut6, la clart6 et
la transparence des informations transmises aux consommateurs, [Law 2017-
1434 of September 29, 2017 on the information obligations of digital platform
operators] Oct. 5, 2017,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035720
925 &fastPos= 1 &fastReqld= 1841709131 &categorieLien-id&oldAction=rechTe
xte.
167 D6cret n' 2017-1436 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations
d'information relatives aux avis en ligne de consommateurs, [Law 2017-1434 of
September 29, 2017 on the information obligations of digital platform operators]
Oct. 5, 2017,
https ://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035720
935&fastPos= 1 &fastReqld= 1799094107&categorieLien-id&oldAction-rechTe
xte.
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President Macron muscled through parliament in September 2017
conspicuously omitted changes addressing platform workers and
other independent contractors.169 The result, as one headline
exclaimed in February 2018, is that "gig workers are desperate for
Macron to fix the rules" governing their activities.) 70 French
leaders, however, appear unwilling to rush the process for fear of
quashing a sector they see as vital to the country's economic
success. 171
Indeed, Macron has not been shy about his ambition to turn
France into a "start-up nation."1 72 Promoting consumers' economic
interests forms a large part of his political motivation. 173 In an
April 2018 interview, he explained that
"[t]he question is how to embrace th[e] change
[brought by the gig economy] and be proud of
it .... Many people explain to French citizens, 'I
will protect you against the side effects of Uber or
Airbnb,' but these companies are here and French
consumers love them .... 174
This sentiment suggests that France will move in a more
consumerist direction if Macron continues to get his way in
parliament. As he reiterated at a later stage of the interview, "I
want my country to be open to disruption and to these new models.
So I will deliver the evidence of that., 175
169 Helene Fouquet, France's Gig Workers Are Desperate for Macron to
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B. The United States: A Site of Ascendant Producerism
Macron's words reflect a legal philosophy that comparative
theory predicts should prevail in the United States. However, the
facts on the ground tell a different story. There is no question that
Uber and its competitors have had success in American markets. 
7 6
These companies have used their sizeable resources to lobby for
friendly legislation throughout the country, winning the right to
operate many of their services without interference.' 
77
Nonetheless, across just about every level of law, the United States
has also been a site of producerist resistance to the way these
companies treat their workers. 178 The federal government has
generally left regulation in this arena to other actors.' 79 As this
section shows, states, cities, and private plaintiffs have stepped in
to fill the void. 8 °
i. Resistance from the States
American states have not been passive bystanders to Uber's
rise. As of today, "48 states and the District of Columbia have
passed [Transportation Network Company (TNC)] legislation to
regulate TNCs in some form."' 181 Several have even taken steps to
order platform markets in ways that mirror more producerist
France.
Some of the earliest legal pushback to companies like Uber can
be traced to state labor commissioners. Though most platform
176 Wolf Richter, Uber and Lyft Are Gaining Even More Market Share
Over Taxis and Rentals, Bus. INSIDER (July 30, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-are-gaining-even-more-market-
share-over-taxis-and-rentals-2018-7.
177 Alison Griwold, Uber Pulled Off a Spectacular Political Coup and
Hardly Anyone Noticed, QUARTZ (Jan. 21, 2016), http://qz.com/589041/uber-
pulled-off-a-spectacular-political-coup-and-hardly-anyone-noticed/
178 See supra Sections LI.A, 11J.B; infra Section III.C.
179 Patrick Gavin, Regional Regulation of Transportation Network
Companies, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 337, 338 (2017).
180 See supra Sections III.A, III.B; infra Section I.C.
181 SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, THE TNC
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TNC REGULATION IN
CALIFORNIA AND ACROSS THE COUNTRY (2017).
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firms have labeled their drivers independent contractors-and
thereby avoided responsibility for providing them stable pay or
benefits-a number of states have contested this classification and
argued that drivers should obtain the same protections as full-time
employees. 182 In doing so, they have sought to even competition
between producers to ensure that consumer sovereignty does not
trump workers' rights.
In June 2015, California's labor commissioner issued a ruling
in favor of an Uber driver seeking reimbursement for work
expenses she incurred while using the company's software. 183
Though the holding did not have precedential authority, it staked
out a clear producerist stance on the duties Uber owes its
workers.'84 The opinion stressed that
"[d]efendants hold themselves out as nothing more
than a neutral technology platform, designed simply
to enable drivers and passengers to transact the
business of transportation. The reality, however, is
that Defendants are involved in every aspect of the
operation .... In light of [this, the plaintiff driver]
was [Uber's] employee."' 8 5
Just four months later, Oregon's labor commissioner issued a
similar advisory, holding that because "Uber suffers or permits
drivers to work for the company's benefit" and because "drivers
are economically dependent on Uber... Uber drivers are
employees."'' 86
182 Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver is
Employee, not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMEs (June 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-
ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html; Elliot Njus, Uber Drivers
Are Employees, Labor Commissioner Says, OREGONIAN (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.oregonlive.com/commuting/index.ssf/2015/10/uber-drivers-are em
ployeeslab.html.
183 Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, Decision of the
Labor Commissioner of the State of California (2015).
184 Id. at 9-10.
185 Id.
186 Or. Dep't of Labor and Industries, Opinion Letter on The Employment
Status of Uber Drivers (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://media.oregonlive.com/commuting/other/1 01415%20Advisory%200pinio
n%20on%20the%20Employment%2OStatus%20of/o2OUber%/20Drivers.pdf.
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Echoing the strategy embodied in France's Thtvenoud Law,
states have also used regulations outside the spheres of labor and
employment to level the playing field for transport providers. The
California Public Utilities Commission, which has primary
regulatory authority over TNCs like Uber,' 87 has introduced
several regulations in this vein.188 Like in France, TNC drivers
may only offer pre-arranged travel, and may not accept "street
hails" from people on the curb.1 89 TNCs are required to complete
criminal background checks of their drivers and exclude applicants
who have committed particular offenses. 19° Furthermore, like
under the Thtvenoud Law, these companies must provide primary
commercial insurance covering each of their drivers in the amount
of $1 million 9 '-the minimum quality of which the California
legislature ratcheted up in 2017.192
Other states have implemented similar regimes. In Colorado,
TNCs must have primary liability insurance covering at least $1
million per incident. The companies must also complete criminal
background checks and annual vehicle safety inspections before
approving drivers. 193 Massachusetts has adopted even stricter
background check requirements than Colorado and California.'
94
All told, 48 states have now implemented minimum insurance
187 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5430 (Deering 2015).
188 Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Safety While
Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry, Cal. Pub. Util.
Commission, Decision 13-09-045 (2013),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOOO/M077/K192/77192355
.PDF.
189 Id. at 30.
190 Id. at 26.
191 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, INSURANCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR TNCs (2018),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3802.
192 Cal. Dept. of Insurance, Comment Letter on Survey of Transportation




193 SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
supra note 181, at 11.
194 Id. at 10-11.
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requirements for TNCs and 42 have enacted background check
requirements for their drivers.195 These rules have minimized
competitive disadvantages between transport providers in a world
where taxis have long operated under similar regulations. 196
ii. Resistance from Cities
Cities have also stepped in to safeguard producer interests.
1 97
No locality has made more visible efforts on this front than Austin,
Texas.' 98 In December 2015, "the city council voted 9-2 in favor of
an ordinance aimed at regulating [TNCs] more like traditional taxi
companies."199 The ordinance required Uber and its competitors to
obtain "permits from the city, pay annual fees, limit driver hours,
and use geo-fenced pickup and drop-off areas during special
events. Most controversially, TNCs were required to complete both
driving history checks and fingerprint background checks of
prospective drivers. ' 2 ° °
The following May, Austin's residents overwhelmingly voted
to defeat a ballot measure funded by Uber and Lyft that would
have rolled back the regulations.20 1 This prompted the companies
195 MAARIT MORAN, BEN ETTELMAN, GRETCHEN STOELTJE, TODD
HANSEN & ASHESH PANT, TEXAS A&M TRANSP. INST., POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES: FiNAL REPORT 19 (Oct. 2017),
https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/PRC- 17-70-F.pdf.
196 See id at 14.
197 Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from
Municipalities All Over the US, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-
municipalities-all-over-the-us.html.
198 See Aman Batheja, With New Rules, Will Uber, Lyfi Stay in Austin?,
TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/12/17/austin-
city-council-approves-new-uber-regs-uber-th/.
199 Id.
200 SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
supra note 181, at 13.
201 Rick Jervis, Austin Voters Reject Uber, Lyft Plan for Self-Regulation,
CNBC (May 8, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/08/austin-voters-reject-
uber-lyft-plan-for-self-regulation.html.
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to abandon operations in the city for a year.20 2 However, in May
2017, with heavy backing from TNCs, the Texas legislature passed
a bill nullifying the Austin ordinance.20 3
Elsewhere around the country, New York City has passed
ordinances requiring TNCs to operate under the jurisdiction of its
Taxi & Limousine Commission, pay a fee for a three-year e-hail
application provider license, obtain commercial insurance covering
all travel, and make drivers go through fingerprinting and
background checks. 2 1 Chicago has enacted laws requiring TNC
drivers to obtain either a public chauffeur license or one of its
newly-created TNC chauffeur permits. 2 5 Additionally, Chicago
has implemented fingerprint-based background checks,
"prohibit[ed] TNC drivers from operating any TNC vehicle for
more than 10 hours in a 24-hour period[,] and prohibit[ed] TNC
vehicles from being driven, even if by more than one driver, for
more than 10 hours in that period. ' 20 6 Both Seattle, Washington
20 7
and Portland, Oregon 20 8 have similarly instituted stringent TNC
insurance, 'background check, data reporting, and operating
standards.
These regulations are not the product of a consumerist regime
that primarily seeks to protect riders' economic wishes. To the
contrary, they add costs that platform firms pass on to consumers
in the form of higher prices. These municipal regulations should
therefore be understood as an attempt to create a degree of parity
202 See Patrick Sisson, Uber and Lyfi Are Coming Back to Austin, CURBED
(May 18, 2017), https://www.curbed.com/2017/5/18/15657684/uber-lyfl-austin-
texas-ridehailing-state-law.
203 Alex Samuels, Uber, Lyft Return to Austin as Texas Gov. Abbott Signs
Ride-Hailing Measure Into Law, TEX. TRIB. (May 29, 2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/29/texas-gov-greg-abbott-signs-measure-
creating-statewide-regulations-rid/.
204 SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
supra note 181, at 12.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See generally Business Regulations: Transportation Network
Companies, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-
for-hires-and-tncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-companies#insurance
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
208 See generally PORTLAND, OR., CODE §§ 16.40.200-290 (2018).
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between TNCs and traditional transport service providers-one of
the classic producerist moves.
iii. Resistance from the Private Bar and the Judicial
System
Finally, private litigation appears to have focused more heavily
on producer welfare than consumers' economic desires. An
original Westlaw analysis of state and federal actions conducted in
May 2018 revealed that Uber had appeared as a named party in
109 different cases since it was founded. 20 9 Of these, 81-or nearly
three-quarters-aimed to vindicate producer interests (Figure 1).
These included cases in which drivers claimed they should be
classified as employees rather than independent contractors for
wage and overtime purposes, 210 contested the minimum criteria to
offer services through the platform,211 and alleged that Uber
engaged in "tortious interference with prospective business
relations." 212 These also included cases in which taxi companies
brought claims against the platform for "false advertising,"213
"unfair competition, ' 2 14 violations of state transportation laws,
2 15
209 This analysis was completed by (1) performing a party name search for
"Uber Technologies" among all state and federal cases; (2) going through all
241 opinions listed and organizing them by matter, which yielded a total of 109
distinct cases; (3) analyzing the contents of these actions and sorting them on the
basis of whether they involved a producerist dispute, a consumerist dispute, or
some other form of disagreement.
210 See, e.g., Lamour v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 1:16-CIV-21449,
2017 WL 878712 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2017); Singh v. Uber Technologies
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 2017); O'Connor v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
211 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1206-
07 (9th Cir. 2016).
212 Lee v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 886, 888 (N.D. Ill.
2016).
213 See, e.g., Greenwich Taxi, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 123 F.
Supp. 3d 327, 334 (D. Conn. 2015).
214 See, e.g., Checker Cab of Philadelphia Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
643 Fed.Appx. 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2016).
215 See, e.g., Mifsud v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 820,
823-24 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
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and the "dismantl[ement of] decades of [antitrust] laws and
regulations. '" 216






By contrast, only seven cases alleged harm to consumers'
economic interests. These included actions by riders who were
simultaneously charged taxi and Uber fares, a2 7 believed the
company misrepresented its gratuity policy, 218 challenged Uber's
cancellation fees,219 alleged they were subject, to fictitious
charges,220 claimed they should not have to pay a "safe rides
216 The Yellow Cab Co. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. RDB-14-2764,
2015 WL 4987653 at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2015).
217 Phillips v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-544-JAG, 2016 WL
165024 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2016).
218 Ehret v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
219 Metter v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-cv-06652-RS, 2017 WL
1374579, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017); Cordas v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
228 F. Supp. 3d 985, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
220 Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL
3751652, at *2 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016).
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fee," 221 and were allegedly overcharged for taxes and tolls. 222 The
handful of remaining cases, involving issues such as intellectual
property,223  computer fraud,224  torts, 225  and disability
discrimination, 226 did not fall neatly into either the consumerist or
producerist category.
Though much private litigation has ended in dismissal or
settlement, it has generated intense public debate about the nature
of gig work-casting Uber's rise through a producerist, rather than
a consumerist, lens. The most prominent of these disputes have
centered on whether TNC drivers should be classified as
employees or independent contractors.227 These battles are high-
stakes: as the next section details, independent contractors have
less income security than employees because they are excluded
from national minimum wage laws, cannot depend on a set number
of work hours, and generally receive few if any benefits from the
company they transact with.228 The flagship case in this arena,
O'Connor v. Uber,229 sparked national . discussions about these
questions after it "received a great deal of media attention [for]
221 McKnight v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 14-cv-05615-JST, 2017 WL
3427895, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017).
222 Tadepalli v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 15-cv-04348-MEJ, 2016 WL
1622881 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016).
223 See, e.g., Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 2017-1904,
2017 WL 4620809 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2017); X One, Inc. v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
224 Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Doe, No. C-15-00908 LB, 2015 WL
1205167 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015).
225 See Evanston Insurance Co. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 15-03988
WHA, 2015 WL 8597239 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015).
226 See e.g., Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of California v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
227 See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy:
Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 479 (2016).
228 Smith & Leberstein, supra note 55, at 1-7.
229 O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Cal.
2014); see Joel Rosenblatt and Bob Van Voris, Uber Drivers Suing for Better
Pay Lose Critical Court Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/uber-wins-appeal-in-
case-targeting-classification-of-drivers.
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[t]he large size of [its] certified class" and settlement of "close to
$100 million. 2 30
A case against Uber's main competitor, Lyft, similarly
highlighted the legal challenges and policy significance of these
disputes.23' In his opinion, Northern California District Court
Judge Vince Chhabria underscored the inadequacy of the legal
standards used to determine whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor.232 Judge Chhabria noted that if the case
eventually reached a jury, it would "be handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes [because t]he
test... courts... developed over the 20th Century for classifying
workers isn't very helpful in addressing this 21st Century
problem." 233
Even in the face of these doctrinal hurdles, courts have started
to find ways to place producer interests over low consumer prices.
In a landmark decision issued in April 2018, the California
Supreme Court scrapped its existing test for determining employee
status and erected a far simpler-and more worker-friendly-
replacement, under which a person is an employee if they do a job
that forms part of the "usual course" of the company's business.
2 34
As The New York Times reported, this "decision could eventually
require companies like Uber, many of which are based in
California, to follow minimum-wage and overtime laws and to pay
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance and payroll
taxes, potentially upending their business models."
235
230 Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 577, 583 (2016).
231 See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
232 Id. at 1081-82.
233 Id.
234 Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 956-
57 (Cal. 2018). Importantly, the California Supreme Court also placed the
evidentiary burden of proving that a person is an independent contractor on the
hiring entity, rather than the worker.
235 Noam Scheiber, Gig* Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in
California Ruling, N.Y. TiMEs (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/business/economy/gig-economy-
ruling.html.
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Indeed, law enforcers are already exploring the possibility of
bringing industry-changing suits using this precedent. In May
2018, in direct response to the California Supreme Court's ruling,
the San Francisco City Attorney "issued subpoenas to Uber and
Lyft to turn over records on whether they classify drivers as
employees or private contractors, as well as records on driver pay
and benefits." 236 Existing case law's producerist slant may
therefore grow even more pronounced in the coming years.
C. A Significant Legal Shift
The French and American legal reactions to platform
companies have confounded the consumerist/producerist theory's
predictions. According to this framework, France should have used
its laws to protect producer welfare and the United States should
have allowed the gig economy to flourish. The facts do not fit
comfortably into either narrative. France certainly began by taking
an aggressive stance toward Uber to safeguard taxi drivers'
livelihoods. 7  Since President Macron's election in 2017,
however, the country has been slow to address gig workers'
ambiguous labor status due to a desire to foster start-ups that will
benefit consumers. 238
The U.S. case is even more surprising. While Uber has enjoyed
success in the country, it has battled strong and growing
producerist headwinds from nearly every part of the legal
system. 239 The California Supreme Court's 2018 ruling, which
makes it easier for gig workers to claim employee status, may
cause Uber's business model to collapse in the state where it is
headquartered. 24 ° The fact that platform work has stirred
consumerist passions in France and producerist backlash in the
236 Press release, City Attorney of San Francisco, Herrera Investigates
Uber, Lyft over Driver Pay and Benefits (May 29, 2018),
https://www.sfcityattomey.org/2018/05/29/herrera-investigates-uber-lyft-driver-
pay-benefits/.
237 See supra Section III.A.i.
238 See supra Section llI.A.ii.
239 See supra Section III.B.
240 See Scheiber, supra note 235; UBER, COMPANY INFO (2019),
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/.
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United States suggests that it represents a frontal challenge to
existing legal orders. If current trends persist, they may well spur
some degree of convergence between the two nations in the
coming years.
IV. How THE GIG ECONOMY UPENDS THE WORLDS OF
WELFARE
An analysis of the worlds of welfare favors similar
conclusions. As discussed earlier, this theory predicts that French
gig workers should experience a much higher degree of
decommodification than their American counterparts. 24 1 However,
a close look at the countries' legal systems shows that they treat
the independent workers who run the platform economy similarly.
Both countries have effectively evolved two-track labor regimes:
employees in SERs enjoy stable pay, fringe benefits, and a range
of public guarantees, while independent workers receive only
residual protections.
A. The United States: Staying True to Its Liberal Roots
When it comes to the independent workforce that companies
like Uber rely on, the United States has lived up to its "liberal
welfare regime" status. These workers are severely disadvantaged
compared to full-time employees with respect to pay, benefit
provisions, and eligibility for social programs. Correspondingly,
they experience very little decommodification: if they cannot
obtain supplemental earnings or insurance from private markets,
they must usually go without it..
Independent contractors do not receive the same income
protections as workers in an SER. The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) establishes a national minimum wage rate242 and mandates
that employers provide overtime compensation. 24 3 However, by
limiting its coverage to "employees,"' 24  the law excludes
241 See supra Section II.B.
242 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2016).
243 Id.
244 § 203.
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independent contractors such as rideshare drivers.245 The result is
"that these workers often earn significantly less than employees or
better-resourced entrepreneurs." 246 A 2015 survey by the Center
for American Progress found that "independent
contractors... self-reported median annual earnings of $25,000
compared with employees' median annual earnings of
$35,000 ... Independent contractors at the 10th percentile in their
respective worker classification self-reported earnings as low as
$4.44 per hour, 57 percent of the earnings reported by employees
at the 10th percentile., 247
These workers fare no better when it comes to benefits and
social protections. As the National Employment Law Project has
observed, most are "not covered under their companies' employee
benefit plans." 248 Businesses do not pay into Social Security or
Medicare-which respectively provide the elderly with retirement
income and healthcare-on these workers' behalf. 249 This forces
independent contractors to shoulder both the employer and
employee shares of these taxes, and to try to recoup the employer
half in tax credits.2
Many federal programs designed to minimize market risks also
exclude independent contractors. Though the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) provides employees with unpaid time off to
care for themselves or a sick relative, 251 the law does not cover
independent contractors.252 These workers are ineligible for
245 Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the
Federal Law, MONTHLY LAB. REV 4 (2002),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/O1/artlfull.pdf.
246 Karla Walter & Kate Balm, Raising Pay and Providing Benefits for
Workers in a Disruptive Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/10/13/440483/r
aising-pay-providing-benefits-workers-disruptive-economy/.
247 Id. at 32.
248 Smith & Leberstein, supra note 55, at 4.
249 Id at 11-12.
250 Topic No. 554 - Self-Employment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.
251 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018).
252 Nancy K. Cauthen, Annette Case, & Sarah Wilhelm, Promoting
Security in a 21st Century Labor Market: Addressing Intermittent
Unemployment in Nonstandard Work, FAMILY VALUES AT WORK ii (Sept.
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Unemployment Insurance, meaning they do not enjoy even
minimal income replacement in the event of job loss.
2 5 3
Furthermore, most states exempt independent contractors from
their workers' compensation systems.
2 5 4
As such, these laborers are left with the minimum social
guarantees available to all low-income Americans, namely Social
Security, Medicaid (which provides healthcare to the poor), the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (which provides food
stamps to the poor), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (which
provides an income subsidy to the working poor in the form of a
tax refund).255 These programs are heavily means-tested, and have
become less generous with time. 62 5 The size of a person's social
security income also varies as a function of the contributions they
make during their working years; this means that independent
contractors' low median incomes put them at an even greater
disadvantage once they reach retirement. 7
B. France: Pushing Workers Toward Residual Welfare
Arrangements
The French case unexpectedly displays a number of
similarities. As noted earlier, most of the country's platform
service providers operate as "auto-entrepreneurs," an independent
contractor status the government created in 2009 to streamline
these workers' tax obligations.2 5 8 Unfortunately, policymakers did




254 See generally Workers' Compensation Laws-State by State
Comparison, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUS (June 7, 2017),
https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workers-compensation-
laws-state-by-state-comparison-5 7181/.
255 See Moffitt, supra note 51, at 729-37.
256 Id.
257 See How Do Benefits Compare to Earnings?, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC.
INS., https://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/benefits-compare-eamings (last
visited Feb. 14, 2019).
258 Precarious Employment in Europe Part H.- Country Case Studies,
supra note 37, at 15-16.
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system might impact this category of earners. 259 Moreover, auto-
entrepreneurs remain exposed to much higher levels of financial
insecurity than people in traditional employment relationships.
Like in the United States, auto-entrepreneurs are not entitled to
a minimum wage because they are deemed to control their own
enterprises. 260 Data show that they earn far less than other types of
workers as a result. A 2012 study released by the INSEE, France's
national institute of statistics, revealed that 90 percent of auto-
entrepreneurs earned below the country's minimum wage, the
"SMIC. ' '261 Across nearly all income levels, auto-entrepreneurs
made around three times less than traditional independent
workers26 2 (such as bakery owners). Even the top tenth percentile
of auto-entrepreneurs only earned an average of C12,000 a year.263
To make matters worse, these already low figures appear to be
declining with time.26' This state of affairs has prompted
increasingly heated protests calling for auto-entrepreneurs to
receive a minimum wage.265
259 Emmanuelle R~ju, Auto-entrepreneur, Un Statut Sous Surveillance, LA
CROLX (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.la-croix.com/Journal/Auto-entrepreneur-
statut-surveillance-2018-01-15-1100905812.
260 See Precarious Employment in Europe Part I. Patterns, Trends, and
Policy Strategy, supra note 29, at 178 (explaining that the French government
created the auto-entrepreneur status "[t]o help people set up their own
businesses."); Precarious Employment in Europe Part II: Country Case Studies,
supra note 37, at 15-16 (noting that auto-entrepreneurs "do not belong to the
traditional wage-earning relationship... [as] independent workers [who] benefit
from simplified tax returns and social security contributions," and that "[m]ore
than nine out of ten auto-entrepreneurs earn less than the minimum wage.").
261 Jr6me Domens & Justine Pigner, Auto-entrepreneurs: Au Bout de
Trois Ans, 90% Digagent Un Revenue Infirieur au Smic au Titre de Leur




264 See Laurianne Salembier & Guilhem Thdron, Revenus d'activitg des
Non-salarids en 2014: Hausse Pour les Indipendants "Classiques, " Baisse
Pour les Auto-entrepreneurs, INSEE (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2531942.
265 Deliveroo: "Les Plateformes se Servent du Statut d'auto-entrepreneur
Pour Faire ce qu'elles Veulent," France Info (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.francetvinfo. fr/economie/autoentrepreneurs/deliveroo-les-
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Auto-entrepreneurs also enjoy fewer social protections than
standard workers. Since they do not have an employer, they do not
collect fringe benefits such as paid leave or vacation days.2 66 Like
in the United States, they are barred from receiving workers'
compensation. 267 Most importantly, auto-entrepreneurs remain
fully excluded from the country's unemployment insurance
system,2 68 leaving them in a precarious position in the event of a
work stoppage. As the head of France's auto-entrepreneurs' union
explained in May 2018, "we have been pleading since the
beginning... to be eligible for the same kind of unemployment
insurance a salaried worker earning the SMIC would receive."
269
While the government recently promised to address the shortfall,
270
it continues to struggle to craft a solution.271
It is true that other parts of the French welfare state help fill
these gaps, particularly the country's retirement and health
systems. 27 2 Even in these domains, however, auto-entrepreneurs
plateformes-se-servent-du-statut-d-auto-entrepreneur-pour-faire-ce-qu-elles-
veulent 2346055.html.
266 See "Quand on est Livreur, on se Fait enc*** par les Plateformes
Num~riques, FRANCE CULTURE (Oct. 27, 2017),
https ://www. franceculture.fr/emissions/hashtag/quand-on-est-livreur-on-se-fait-
enc-par-les-plateformes-numeriques.
267 La S&urit6 Sociale pour les Ind~pendants Verse-t-elle des lndemnitis
Journalires en cas d'accident du Travail?, PREvLSSIMA (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.previssima.fr/question-pratique/le-rsi-verse-t-il-des-indemnites-
j ournalieres-en-cas-daccident-du-travail.html.
268 AMAR & VIOSSAT, supra note 55, at 102-103.
269 Marion Perroud, Assurance Ch6mage: les Auto-entrepreneurs, Grands
Oubli~s de la Rdformne?, CHALLENGES (May 3, 2018. 6:47 PM),
https://www.challenges.fr/economie/social/assurance-chomage-les-auto-
entrepreneurs-grands-oublies-de-la-reforme_571600 (translation by author).
270 Sarah Belouezzane & Bertrand Bissuel, L'Executif Plaide Pour Une




271 Source AFP, Reforme Assurance Ch6mage: Le Conseil d'tat
Demande des Modifications, LE POINT (Apr. 28, 2014, 6:20 PM),
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suffer significant disadvantages. These programs vary in
generosity according to workers' incomes. 273 Retirement benefits
are heavily dependent on a worker's lifetime earnings.274
Furthermore, while the state provides baseline medical coverage to
all citizens, co-payments in the range of 25 to 35 percent remain
common.275 Upper- and middle-class workers buy top-up insurance
to avoid these costs; low-income workers like auto-entrepreneurs
usually cannot afford it.276 Aggravating matters, the "free
supplementary health insurance [that low-income workers receive
(the CMU)] does not cover all fees .... [B]eneficiaries of the
CMU are [also] significantly more likely to be refused treatment
when they present themselves as CMU recipients. 277
Collectively, these forces deepen a welfare dualization process
that the rise of earlier forms of non-standard work got underway.278
As political scientists Philippe Askenazy and Bruno Palier have
observed, in France,
[t]wo distinct worlds of welfare have come to
coexist .... The French population.., seems to be
increasingly divided into, on the one hand, those
who can rely on a rather generous social insurance
program and continue to have access (thanks to
their employers or their own health) to private
complements, and on the other hand, those who
have fallen out of that system and are dependent on
minimum benefits. 279
273 Idat 107-08.
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Put another way, French laws-and in many cases their
absence-have helped "increase inequalities and divide
society. 28 °
C. Collapsing Distinctions Between the Worlds of Welfare
The gig economy appears to pose as significant a challenge to
welfare regimes as it does to labor markets. While theory predicts
that French laws should do far more to decommodify platform
workers than American social programs, empirical evidence shows
that they do not. Both countries deny independent workers a
minimum wage, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation,
and access to fringe benefits such as paid leave and vacation days.
In doing so, they force gig workers to rely on health, retirement,
and income guarantees that are universally available but markedly
less generous than those enjoyed by standard workers. These
results are surprising given France's reputation as a low-inequality
nation with extensive public protections. 281 If the country does not
address these shortfalls in the coming years, it may find itself
converging toward the liberal welfare state model as platform
firms expand.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the gig economy and non-standard employment has
substantially altered the nature of work. In doing so, it has
generated intense debates about labor market design, welfare
institutions, and inequality. Nonetheless, the legal significance of
these shifts has remained opaque. This Article has aimed to bring
analytical clarity to this question by comparing the French and
American responses to platform work.
Comparative legal theory anticipated two patterns: first, that
French law would suppress the sector to protect producers'
interests while U.S. law would welcome its low prices, and second,
280 Id. at 27.
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GROWING UNEQUAL? COUNTRY NOTE: FRANCE 1 (2008),
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that the French welfare system would better protect gig workers
than its American counterpart. 282
Empirical analysis has revealed that neither of these predictions
hold.283 While France initially did everything it could to prevent
Uber from competing with taxi services, it has since relaxed its
stance toward the industry.284 Meanwhile, the United States has
become a site of mounting resistance to the way platform
companies treat their workers.285 In the welfare arena, the two
countries have treated the independent workers who underwrite the
gig economy's growth in a similar manner, offering them only
minimal protection from a precarious existence. 286
Aside from American social policy's persistent thrift, none of
these trends accords with past behavior. This finding suggests that
those who have labeled the gig economy an assault on existing
legal structures are largely correct. It further intimates that long-
dissimilar countries' labor market policies may start to converge.
Only time will tell exactly how these regimes will evolve. One
thing, however, is certain: lawmakers must devote more attention
to the plight of workers caught in what looks to be a fundamental
legal reordering.
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